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"The economics of prosecutors is largely underdeveloped." (Garoupa 2012:239) 
Introduction
It is generally agreed that prosecutors possess sweeping powers and abundant discretion regarding the use of these powers (see, e.g., Tonry 2012 or Weigend 2012 . If anything, their powers have increased in recent years, as governments have attempted to reduce the workload of judges by shifting additional competencies to prosecutors.
Given the powers of prosecutors, it is amazing how little research has been devoted to them. Whereas research on both the efficiency of court systems and the economic effects of independent judges has made substantial progress over the last ten years (Voigt 2016 is a survey of the former, Voigt et al. 2015 a contribution to the latter), no similar progress can be reported regarding the efficiency of prosecutorial agencies or the effects of prosecutorial independence (PI).
In this article, we contribute to changing that. Specifically, we use a novel indicator of PI to evaluate the effects of PI on the accountability of government officials in terms of being prosecuted when suspected of a crime. PI is a crucial precondition for realizing the rule of law. If the most important single trait of the rule of law is that everybody, regardless of their position in society, is treated equally under the law, and yet prosecutors are not independent from the government, then the rule of men will prevail over the rule of law, because the government can influence who is and who is not prosecuted.
It has even been argued that for politicians who are interested in reaching political goals via the judiciary, putting pressure on prosecutors -and, thus, tinkering with their independence -could be more attractive than trying to influence judges, simply because the latter would arouse a lot more opposition (Voigt and Wulf 2017) . It has further been argued that the prosecution of political figures may depend critically on the independence of prosecutors (Aaken et al. 2004 ).
Here, we are interested in two questions. First, is PI an important determinant of the actual prosecution of public officials in case of misconduct? If public officials are suspected of having committed a crime, such as having accepted bribes, we would expect higher prosecution rates for such cases in countries where prosecutors are independent. Our second question is, what happens if prosecutors are independent from government, but are themselves corrupt? If prosecutors accept bribes, for instance, for not prosecuting specific cases or for recommending inappropriate indictments, then the prosecution of cases against public officials might suffer, even when there are high levels of PI. Thus, we inquire into whether the effect of PI on the prosecution of public officials is conditional on the level of prosecutorial corruption (PC).
What follows in Section 2 is a brief summary of the available literature that deals with PI and its effects. In Section 3, we introduce two new indicators based on data from the World Justice Project, one for PI and the other one for PC. In Section 4, these new indicators are used to answer our research questions. Section 5 concludes, and sketches a number of possible follow-up projects that could help improve our understanding of a powerful, yet under-researched, part of the justice system.
Brief Literature Survey
Following Aaken et al. (2010) , we speak of prosecutors if they have the following competencies: (1) to gather information on the behavior of criminal suspects, or to instruct the police to gather information, (2) to indict a suspect, and (3) to represent the interests of the public during a trial.
Next, we propose to think of PI as a state in which prosecutors have no reason to expect that their lawful professional activities will result in negative consequences for themselves, such as being expelled, being transferred to another position or location, or being paid less. PI, thus, refers to the relationship between prosecutors and the government, and is logically distinct from the presence or absence of corruption. Clearly, prosecutors could be independent from governmental interference and still lack impartiality if they are willing to accept bribes or behave in other corrupt ways.
The only inquiry into the effects of PI on public-sector corruption in the extant literature is Aaken et al. (2010) . They argue that crimes committed by government officials are more likely to be prosecuted if the prosecutors enjoy independence from influence by the government. The non-prosecution of crimes increases the attractiveness of committing them, which is why Aaken et al. (2010) expect a clear association between high levels of PI and low levels of public-sector corruption.
They construct two measures of PI, one de jure and the other one de facto, and show that only higher levels of de facto PI are robustly associated with lower levels of perceived public-sector corruption.
Here, we add to the literature in various ways. First, by using, for the first time, an indicator for PI based on data from the World Justice Project. Second, by explaining the likelihood that corrupt public officials will be prosecuted based on characteristics of prosecution agencies. As argued in the introductory section, the non-prosecution of corrupt officials is not necessarily a consequence of a lack of PI, but could also be the consequence of PC. In our analysis, we distinguish five types of officials and their respective likelihood to be prosecuted if they are suspected of having committed a crime.
Measuring Prosecutorial Independence and Prosecutorial Corruption
The two indicators used in our empirical analysis come from the World Justice Project (WJP). This project was founded in 2006 and, since 2008, produces an annual rule of law index. This index is made up of eight categories (such as "absence of corruption" or "criminal justice") and it is based on surveys drawn from both general population and experts (see Botero et al. 2011 ).
The two measures proposed here make PI and PC comparable across countries. 
Effects of PI on the Prosecution of Public Officials
We use the two measures introduced in the last section to answer the two main questions of this article. Namely, can PI explain the actual prosecution of public officials deemed corrupt, and is this effect conditional on PC? Equation (1) depicts the expected utility from accepting bribes based on Becker's (1968) seminal economic model of crime. If is the likelihood that criminal behavior is not detected, then the first term depicts the potential utility from being corrupt, whereas the second term deals with the disutility if the corrupt practice is detected, which occurs with probability (1 − ).
To date, studies working with the expected utility framework of crime calculate the expected cost of criminal behavior by multiplying the likelihood of being detected with the size of the sanction. Implicitly, it is assumed that detected crime is always punished. But criminal justice systems are not perfect, and to make this explicit we add the probability to the equation. This variable expresses the probability of a discovered criminal being prosecuted, sentenced, and punished. Since our focus is on both the independence as well as the corruption of prosecutors, is interpreted here as the probability that criminal behavior will be prosecuted after it has been discovered. Our empirical analysis aims at measuring the importance of PI for the level of . It can be expected that is larger when prosecutors are independent, at least if prosecutorial corruption is low. This would imply that increasing the independence of prosecutors and fighting corruption among prosecutors are important instruments to deter crime.
The WJP also produces indicators for the probability that criminal acts of various government officials are prosecuted. These indicators reflect the prosecution of: (1) high government officials, (2) legislators, (3) police officers, (4) local government officials, and (5) mayors. This means that we have five different indicators for .
The WJP survey questions underlying these indicators are listed in Appendix B. In cases where more than one variable is available per category, for example to measure the propensity that police officers are prosecuted, we simply take the mean value of these variables.
To inquire into the relevance of PI and PC for the level of , we estimate the following model, once for each category of public officials:
Our vector of control variables follows Aaken et al. (2010) and includes a country's log-income per capita, trade openness, log-population size, share of Protestants in the population, and a dummy indicating whether the country was a British colony. Table 1 shows a correlation matrix based on these control variables and our two indicators of interest. Countries with higher income per capita and a larger share of Protestants in the population show higher levels of PI and less PC. Aside from the main effects of PI and PC, we also include an interaction term. This allows us to estimate the conditional effect of PI on the prosecution of public officials, depending on the level of PC. We expect that PI will only display an effect when PC is sufficiently low (i.e., when the indicator for the absence of PC takes high values). Table 2 shows the regression results. It is well-known that the interpretation of coefficient estimates for a conditional effect can be complicated (as illustrated by Brambor et al. 2006 ). Thus, Figure 2 plots the marginal effects of PI on the propensity that public officials are being prosecuted conditional on the level of PC, including 95%-confidence intervals. The results for members of parliament, local government officers and mayors are in line with our theoretical predictions. PI increases the likelihood that these public officials are prosecuted in case they are suspected of criminal behavior, but only if prosecutors are largely free from corruption. In other words, where prosecutors are corrupt, the accountability of government officials cannot be increased by merely enhancing the independence of prosecutors.
<< Figure 2 >>
We find no significant effect of PI on the prosecution of high-ranking government officers. Moreover, our empirical model has far less explanatory power for this indicator than for any of the other dependent variables. A possible interpretation is that the prosecution of such high-ranking government officers depends on factors other than the general level of PI.
We also find no significant effect of PI on the prosecution of police officers, although our model can explain a large share of the variation in this indicator. We find that PC matters for the prosecution of police officers, independent of the level of PI (see Model [3] in Table 2 ). This means that police officers are prosecuted equally by dependent and independent public prosecutors, but they are less likely to be prosecuted whenever prosecutors are corrupt. This result makes intuitive sense, as police officers typically lack the necessary political influence to benefit from the nonindependence of prosecutors.
Overall, these results suggest that PI is important for the prosecution of public officials suspected of criminal behavior and, hence, for the accountability of the government. Yet, not all public employees are sufficiently influential to pressure dependent prosecutors, and specifically the prosecution of police officers depends on the level of PC rather than on PI. Also, some high-ranking public employees might be sufficiently influential to get away with criminal behavior, even if prosecutors are formally independent. Our simple empirical model largely fails to predict the likelihood that these high-ranking government officers are prosecuted.
Conclusions and Next Steps
A few years back, Garoupa (2012) claimed that the economics of prosecutors is underdeveloped. It is about time to change this, because prosecutors enjoy a large degree of discretion and play an important part in establishing the rule of law. (Silver 2017 ). Hence, research should pay more attention to instruments that hold independent prosecutors accountable without undermining their independence (see, e.g., Di Federico 1998 , Michel 2017 or Rios-Fígueroa 2012).
